The following views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the American Council for Capital Formation
Demographic shifts compel governments to act by challenging the assumptions of current policy. Falling fertility rates make it harder to sustain expansive social programs, while demand for immigrant labor increases—often provoking controversy.
Elite opinion can shape government for decades. The Progressive emphasis on the public role of neutral experts, the rise of Keynesian and supply-side economics, and the emergence of regulation as a central focus of government are a few of the examples from the past 100 years.
Shifts in legal thought can lead to significant political consequences. During the Warren court, jurisprudence focused on individual rights and the “living Constitution.” Since then, concepts like strict construction, originalism and the unitary executive have gained prominence.
Finally, politics can be downstream from itself. When voters come to believe that a dominant party has gone too far, the stage is set for political backlash. When that backlash goes too far, the cycle continues. Joe Biden’s weak immigration policy opened the door for Donald Trump’s return to the White House. But the Trump administration’s no-holds-barred effort to deport swaths of illegal immigrants who do vital work in agriculture, construction and hospitality has led a majority of Americans to conclude that the administration has gone too far.
In a recent article, David Brooks points to a cultural phenomenon—the common belief that social order has collapsed—as the catalyst for the latest emergence of populism in America. No doubt many of Mr. Trump’s supporters view his attacks on universities, journalists, bureaucrats and others as an overdue effort to restore order—and a satisfying response to the disrespect they feel from educated elites.
But it is economic change that lies at the heart of the working-class revolt. As late as the 1960s, industrial production dominated the economies of cities and smaller communities across the country. Factories offered steady employment with increasing wages for nearly one-third of the workforce, many with expanding healthcare and pension benefits. Economic order underpinned social order. When foreign competition began to erode American economic order, it wasn’t long before social order weakened and working-class discontent spread.
Mr. Brooks rightly points to stable families as a pillar of social order. But as economic opportunity for working-class men shrank in the U.S., so did working-class marriage rates—even as marriage remained relatively stable among those with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Meanwhile, divorce rates in working-class marriages have become much higher than in marriages between more educated and well-off Americans.
Conservative critics have argued that feminism would be especially harmful to marriage among educated women, but they got it backward. These women were more likely than their lower-income counterparts to get and stay married—provided that their spouses were prepared to accept a more equal share of responsibility for child-rearing and household work.
